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Stable Marriages: 
Substituting Linearity for Discreteness 
by ALVIN E. ROTH,14 URIEL G. ROTHBLUM ,15 
and JOHN H. VANDE VATE” 
Computational techniques can be generally classified into three groups--discrete 
methods, algebraic methods, and continuous methods. Discrete (or combinatorial) meth- 
ods apply arguments like counting, interchanging, and comparisons; algebraic methods 
use comparisons and the four arithmetic operations (addition, subtraction, multiplica- 
tion, and division); and continuous methods rely on continuity arguments, differ- 
entiation, and integration. A corresponding classification is frequently used to 
describe computational problems according to the operations used in their definition 
and the techniques that seem fit to solve them. However, boundaries that define classes 
of problems are sometimes vague, as the type of techniques that are useful for solving a 
problem cannot always be anticipated. For example, linear programming can be viewed 
as an algebraic problem, as it is defined by using inequalities and the four arithmetic 
operations. However, the simplex method, developed by Dantzig in 1948 for solving 
linear programs, has a discrete component, as it searches over a finite set of extreme 
points. On the other hand, the recent developments of interior-point methods for 
solving linear programs rely on continuous techniques. These examples demonstrate the 
usefulness of crossing boundaries between the classes. 
The purpose of this paper is to introduce another instance where it becomes fruitful 
to cross boundaries between classes of computational techniques. Specifically, we 
consider the stable-marriage problem introduced by Gale and Shapley (1962)-a 
problem which has been studied extensively by mostly discrete methods for the last 
three decades. We show how algebraic techniques that rely on the theory of linear 
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inequalities and linear programming can be used to streamline and unify arguments 
while producing more general results. Furthermore, the algebraic framework suggests a 
broadening of the scope of the problem by considering time-sharing stable matchings. 
Formally, let M and W denote two finite disjoint sets. These sets will have the 
interpretation of groups of men and women, respectively. For each m B M we have a 
subset W, of W and a strict preference relation >m defined on W,. Similarly, for 
each w E W we have a subset M, of M and a strict preference relation >w on M,. 
For me M, we say that the members of W, are acceptable to m and that those 
in W \ W, are unacceptable to him. Similarly, for w E W, we say that the members of 
M, are acceptable to w and that those in M \ M, are unacceptable to her. Also, the set 
of acceptable pairs, denoted by A, is the set A I {(m, w) : m E M, and w E W,,,}. Next 
consider (partial) matchings of men to women. In particular, a matching is defined to be 
stable if all matched pairs are mutually acceptable and if there exist no man and woman 
who each prefer the other to their assignment in the matching (a mate is preferable to 
being single if and only if the mate is acceptable). Using an algorithm in which men 
propose to women, who make tentative acceptances and rejections from among their 
suitors, Gale and Shapley constructively showed that a stable matching exists for each 
profile of individual preferences. The above model has a variant where individuals of 
one of the two sexes can be matched to a number of individuals of the opposite sex. 
This situation arises, for example in labor markets or in the problem of matching 
student applicants to colleges. 
An extensive literature has followed the paper of Gale and Shapley [for references 
see the books of Knuth (1976) Gusfield and Irving (1989) and Roth and Sotomayor 
(1990)]. Further, the stable-marriage problem has important applications when the 
model is generalized beyond one-to-one matchings. Roth (1984) showed that 
the stability or instability of the matchings served to explain much of the history 
of the market for American medical interns. Studies of similar entry-level labor markets 
in Britain further support stability as an explanation of market success and failure; see 
Roth (1990). 
Though the description of the marriage problem is simple, its analysis has drawn 
from a surprisingly broad range of mathematical techniques. Of course, stability can be 
formulated via fixed points of (discrete) correspondences, and we have already men- 
tioned that the existence proof for stable matchings due to Gale and Shapley relies on a 
discrete algorithm. Also, as matchings can be represented by sets of arcs in bipartite 
graphs with pairwise disjoint vertices, graph theory has motivated other combinatorial 
algorithms for the stable-marriage problem, e.g., the computation of all stable match- 
ings; see Gusfield and Irving (1989). Lattice theory has also been used to study the 
problem. Conway (see Knuth, 1976), showed that the set of stable marriages forms a 
finite distributive lattice where the join (meet) of two stable matchings is obtained by 
letting each man have the better (worse) of the two outcomes assigned to him by the 
underlying matchings. 
As reflected by the above paragraph, the study of the stable-marriage problem has 
mostly relied on discrete arguments. This fact is surprising in view of the success of 
algrebraic techniques for computing optimal assignments via the simplex method 
of linear programming for computing Nash equilibria for two-person (nonzero-sum) 
games by Lemke’s algorithm. Further, algebraic techniques have been successfully 
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employed to analyze another model, called the assignment game, to obtain results 
which parallel those established for the marriage problem via discrete methods. 
Algebraic techniques to study the stable-marriage problem were only recently intro- 
duced by Vande Vate (1988), who obtained a surprising representation of stable 
matchings as the extreme points of a polytope defined by a simple system of linear 
inequalities, under the assumption that no agent remains single. Rothblum (1990) 
simplified Vande Vate’s proof and extended its applicability to the general model. 
In the following we survey some recent analysis of the stable-marriage problem, 
obtained in roth, Rothblum, and Vande Vate (1990), which uses further (linear) 
algebraic techniques to obtain new results and unify arguments of old results about the 
stable-marriage problem. We do not include proofs here. 
Each matching of men to women is represented by a (partial) assignment matrix, 
i.e. an integer matrix x = { xij}ieM,jew satisfying 
C xij < l 
jEW 
for each i E M, (1) 
for each je W, 
xij 2 0 for all ieM and jeW. (3) 
We observe that a matching is stable if and only if the associated assignment matrix x 
satisfies the following linear constraints: 
rij = 0 forall (i,j)E(M x W)\ A, (4) 
C x,j+ iFmxiw+ X,, 2 1 for all (m, w) EA. 
i>,w W 
(5) 
where, for the sake of brevity, “j >,,, w” is used in the summation to denote {j E W : 
j >m w} and “i >w m” is used to denote {i E M : i >u, m}; see Vande Vate (1988) and 
Rothblum (1990). So the stable matchings are exactly the integer solutions of (l)-(5). 
Further, it is established in these references that the extreme points of the polytope 
defined by (l)-(5) are precisely its integer solutions, i.e., the stable matchings. Thus, 
we are motivated to consider the following linear program: 
PROCIUM MP. 
subject to 
x satisfies (l)-(5). 
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The dual of Program MP has variables {(Y,,J,,,~~, {&,},,w. and {-Y~,J~,,,,~~~~. 
corresponding to the constraints (l), (2), and (5), respectively. It is given by: 
PROGRAM DMP. 
min c %n + c P, + c -Ymw 
m& WEW (m,w)EA 
subject to 
a, 2 0, P, 2 0, and -Y,,,~ 2 0 forall meM and wEW. (7) 
The next result asserts that a feasible solution to Program DMP is implicit in each 
feasible solution of Program MP. Thus, the duality theorem of linear programming 
implies that each feasible solution of Program MP is optimal and its associated dual 
solution is dual optimal. We know of no other linear program whose primal solutions 
contain solutions to its dual. 
THEOREM 1. Let r be a feasible solution of Program MP. Then CY, /3, and y dinned 
by a, = CjEw x,,,~ f&-m E M, 0, = CisM xiu; for w E W, and Y,,,~ = x,, for (m, w) E 
M x W are feasible for Program DMP, and their dual objective equals the primal 
objective of x. In particular, x is optimal for Program MP and (Q, fl, y) is optimal for 
Program DMP . 
Theorem 1 implies that all feasible solutions of Program MP share the same primal 
objective; in particular, restricting this result to stable matchings, we have that the same 
number of people are matched under all stable matchings. This conclusion is strength- 
ened in the next theorem, whose proof follows from Theorem 1 and the complementary 
slackness theorem. 
THEOREM 2. Let x and x’ be any two feasible solutions of Program MP. Then for 
each m EM, Ijew x,,,~ = Cjew xAj E {0, l}, and for each w E W, CisM xilD = EisM r;, 
E {O,l}. Further, fw each pair (m, w) EA for which xmw > 0, Ej,,, xhj + Ci,w 
xi:, + x& = k. 
Let M1={mEM:Cjswxmj=lforall x satisfying (l)-(5)}, and let W, = {we 
w : CiEM xiw = 1 for all x satisfying (l)-(5)}. Th eorem 2 implies that all stable 
matchings assign the men in M, to the women in W, and leave all men in M 1 M, and 
women in W \ W, unmatched. 
We next extend the lattice structure of stable matchings to the feasible set of 
Program MP. Let x and y be two feasible solutions of Program MP, and let m E M. We 
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say that x m-major&es y if 
c xmj 2 j>cwy,,,j for each w E W. 
_+,w m 
We note that m-majorization extends the individual preference relation of m (which is 
defined over the set of deterministic assignments of women to m) to a partial order over 
the set of distributions over women. We say that r M-majorizes y, written x aM y, if x 
m-majorizes y for every m EM. The partial order of W-majoritation is defined 
symmetrically. 
THEOREM 3. The feasible set of Program MP is a distributive lattice under the 
partial order aM with joins and meets given by 
fw each (m, w) EA. Moreover, the dual lattice is obtained by considering the partial 
order of W-majorization 
The duality between the lattices defined on the feasible set of Program MP by M- 
and W-majorization can be viewed as an illustration of the “conflict of the sexes.” 
The set of stable matchings is a sublattice of the lattice identified in Theorem 3; 
hence, standard results about finite lattices assure that it has a maximal element, which 
is called the men-optimal stable matching. It has been observed (e.g., see Roth and 
Sotomayor, 1990, Chapter 4) that individual women might have an incentive to 
misrepresent their preferences to improve their outcome under the men-optimal stable 
matching, but that no man has such an incentive. We next establish this result by 
showing that for each man, say man 1, the stability constraints of the other individuals 
prevent him from doing better than the woman he is allocated by the men-optimal 
matching, say w*. This is accomplished by considering the following linear program: 
PROGRAM MPl. 
ma C %lj 
j>,w* 
subject to: 
r satisfies (l)-(3), 
c ~,~+~~~x~~+x,,>l forall (m,w)EA with mfl, 
j>_w IG 
XIII, = 0 foreach (m,w)E(MX W)\ 
x[AU {(l,w):leM,}]. 
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THEOREM 4. The optimal objective of Program MPl is zero. 
The above approach to incentive compatability is further explored in Roth, 
Rothblum, and Vande Vate (1990) to study incentives of coalitions consisting of more 
than a single man. 
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Results on Invariant Cones17 
by RONALD J. STERN18 and HENRY WOLKOWICZ1’ 
1. Introduction 
Polyhedral cones are easily represented algebraically using systems of linear 
inequalities. Ellipsoidal cones, i.e. cones that have ellipsoidal cross sections, can also be 
handled algebraically using the solution set of an inequality. Unlike the polyhedral 
cones, the ellipsoidal cones have a smooth boundary. The ellipsoidal cones form a 
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